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Truth, Epidemiology, and  
General Causation 
Douglas L. Weed† 
INTRODUCTION 
Does epidemiology, a basic science of disease causation, 
seek and find the truth? Certainly there are those who say  
it does: physicians,1 epidemiologists,2 even lawyers.3 Many 
philosophers of science these days, on the other hand, are 
extremely skeptical of claims to scientific truth.4 And were it 
not for some important practical matters facing epidemiologists 
in the courtroom and in other parts of our professional practice, 
  
 † Currently, Vice President, THE WEINBERG GROUP, INC. in Washington DC. 
I want to acknowledge the helpful comments of Dr. Michelle Althuis in the preparation 
of this paper. 
 1 For a discussion of the role of epidemiology “in the search for clinical 
truth,” see, e.g., Ann M. Kosloske, Epidemiology as the Search for Truth, 11 SEMINARS 
IN PEDIATRIC SURGERY 162, 162 (2002). 
 2 As one epidemiologist stated in a discussion of post-viral fatigue syndrome: 
For many, [post-viral fatigue syndrome] represents a “rag bag” diagnosis into 
which unsolved diagnostic problems are discarded. Others are in no doubt 
that there is a discrete syndrome, probably with a specific causation. The real 
answer almost certainly lies somewhere in between, but the truth can only  
be established through epidemiological studies designed to answer key 
questions. 
P.G. Wallace, Epidemiology: A Critical Review, 47 BRIT. MED. BULL. 942, 942 (1991). 
 3 “Both law and science are truth-seeking endeavors. In at least one respect, 
lawyers and scientists are like Agent Mulder on the ‘X-Files’: we believe that the truth 
is out there and our goal is to find it.” Arthur H. Bryant & Alexander Reinert, 
Epidemiology in the Legal Arena and the Search for Truth, 154 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 
(SUPP.) S27, S27 (2001). 
 4 For example, Peter Lipton writes: 
The status of the truth hypothesis [according to which, science is generating 
increasingly accurate representations of a mind-independent and largely 
unobservable world], and so of realism, thus remains unsettled: it is neither 
undermined by the pessimistic induction nor confirmed by the miracle 
argument. Nor do I know of any other arguments that even come close to 
closing the question. This suggests that the rational attitude towards a 
scientific theory should never rise above the level of agnosticism.  
Peter Lipton, The Medawar Lecture 2004: The Truth About Science, 360 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1259, 1268 (2005). 
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we could leave it at that; epidemiologists seek the truth but 
have no theoretical justification for saying they have found it. 
Seeking the truth and actually obtaining the truth, in other 
words, are different activities evaluated in very different ways. 
The problem with this perspective is that those who rely on 
claims about disease causation—the patients, the public at 
large, and the litigants—may prefer that the professionals who 
have promised to help them—the physicians and epidemiolo-
gists, for example—act with “truth” rather than a “search for 
truth” on their side. At stake for all these individuals are 
actions that can change lives in profound ways: therapeutic 
decisions, public health recommendations, and legal opinions.  
One popular escape from this conundrum is for 
epidemiologists (and any others who both do the science and 
use it) to lay claim to something close to the truth rather than 
truth itself. When asked about whether they have actually 
obtained the truth, epidemiologists typically do a little back-
pedaling and say that they are only more-or-less certain about 
what is true. They say that their claims about what causes 
diseases are only approximations to the truth. In doing so, they 
allow themselves the luxury of never actually dealing with the 
nature of truth as such. They need only assert that they are 
trying to reach the truth and believe that they are somewhere 
close to achieving it. But they never actually find the truth. In 
the end, they are only more or less certain about being more or 
less close to the truth. 
This approach seems to have worked pretty well in the 
practice of medicine and public health where no one ever 
promised to provide the truth in the first place. Promises are 
made, but not about the truth. Epidemiologists, for example, 
promise to prevent disease. Physicians promise to treat 
disease. Neither profession, however, promises to provide the 
truth about the scientific theories that undergird their 
respective practices.5 When pushed on this point, they will only 
  
 5 The idea that promises are made to society by epidemiologists and 
physicians emerges from the discussion of the nature of these professions in 
contemporary society. As I have described:  
[M]odern professions are recognized by a common education, a common ethic, 
and professional standards. But at a deeper level, professions are 
characterized by whom they serve and what promise they make to assist 
those served. The original meaning of the word “profession” is to “declare 
publicly,” thus, professional declare they have special knowledge, they can 
help, and they will do so in the interest of others. Examples include 
physicians, teachers, and ministers. In each case, the professional fulfills a 
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say that they seek the truth and that they are more or less 
certain that they are somewhere near it. 
The practice of law is another matter altogether. In the 
courtroom, when epidemiologists (and physicians and many 
others) provide expert testimony on disease causation in toxic 
tort litigation, they swear to tell the truth, the whole truth,  
and nothing but the truth. What does it mean, then, for 
epidemiologists (and for jurisprudence) if they make such a 
promise but only seek some approximation to the truth—
something more or less close to the truth—rather than actually 
ever finding it?  
My purpose in this essay is to examine this issue in 
terms that will require a critical assessment of the nature of 
truth in epidemiology. Of particular interest here is the role of 
truth in solving the problem of disease causation, the central 
scientific problem of the profession and a key concern in toxic 
tort litigation. I will limit my remarks to general causation, 
leaving aside causation in individuals, that is, specific causa-
tion.6 
In Part I, I briefly discuss “telling the truth” well beyond 
the need for honesty and prohibitions against falsification and 
fabrication in the practice of science but also in the business of 
expert testimony. Telling the “truth” about science is to tell 
what has been published in the scientific literature, no more 
and no less. This is the truth of studies and their results and 
the methods used to obtain those results. In Part II, I discuss 
the implications of “telling the whole truth.” The whole truth, 
in this context, must include not only the so-called original 
published studies but also the commentaries on those studies. 
These typically appear as systematic reviews, editorials, and 
  
promise inherent in the act of profession by making a claim and by following 
up on that claim by specific actions that identify that profession. Thus 
physicians claim to restore health through the central act of healing . . . . 
[and epidemiologists] claim to prevent disease. 
Douglas L. Weed, Science, Ethics Guidelines, and Advocacy in Epidemiology, 4 ANNALS 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 166, 169-70 (1994) (endnote omitted). For a more comprehensive 
account of the role of the physician in modern society, see generally Edmund D. 
Pellegrino, Toward a Reconstruction of Medical Morality: The Primacy of the Act of 
Profession and the Fact of Illness, 4 J. MED. & PHIL. 32 (1979). 
 6 To consider the problem of general causation is to consider whether an 
agent (e.g., an exposure factor) is capable of causing disease, typically in a population. 
Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 392 (2d ed. 2000). Specific 
causation, on the other hand, involves considering whether exposure to an agent was 
responsible for a single individual’s disease. Id. at 396.  
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other publications, including textbook chapters, where the 
studies’ strengths and weaknesses are described and where 
evidence is summarized, synthesized, and interpreted, for the 
purpose of making claims about causation. It is increasingly 
accepted in the practice of epidemiology that a systematic 
narrative review of the evidence is the appropriate venue for 
assessing cause and for making claims about disease causation. 
In Part III, I explore the most controversial component of the 
honesty oath: telling “nothing but the truth.” This will require 
a serious reconsideration of the nature of truth in epidemiologic 
science. I discuss the extent to which those components of the 
practice of epidemiology that transcend its written historical 
record can be considered true: the aims and values of its 
practitioners, their modes of reasoning, the theories and 
philosophies used to help solve the problem of general 
causation, as well as the causal claims themselves, whether 
published or not. Of particular importance is the fact that 
expert testimony goes beyond that which has been published. It 
can only be true in the same sense that published studies and 
published causal assessments are true if the expert applies the 
same methods and rigor to his testimony as that which is 
required for results and causal claims to appear and to be 
accepted in the peer-reviewed literature. 
I. THE TRUTH 
At first glance, no single concept seems better suited for 
what a scientist believes is her ultimate aim than the truth. 
The search for truth in science is legendary.7 It is a search for 
the really real, a search to separate fact from fantasy. The 
  
 7 Philip Kitcher writes about science and its search for truth as a point of 
view so popular and important that he dubs it “Legend.” PHILIP KITCHER, THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE: SCIENCE WITHOUT LEGEND, OBJECTIVITY WITHOUT 
ILLUSIONS 3 (1993). He notes that there have been 
differences among the versions of Legend. Some thought in ambitious terms: 
ultimately science aims at discovering the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth about the world. Others preferred to be more modest, 
viewing science as directed at discovering truth about those aspects of nature 
that impinge most directly upon us, those that we can observe (and, perhaps, 
hope to control). On either construal, discovery of truth was valued both for 
its own sake and for the power that discovery would confer upon us.  
 Id. 
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search for truth is an independent and objective assessment of 
what is “out there” in the world in which we live.8  
Or so we have been told, over and over, by those who 
have trained us. I realize now, however, some thirty years after 
the last lecture in graduate school, that no one ever explained 
to me during my scientific training what exactly this thing 
called the “truth” is. Indeed, no one has ever held something up 
in front of me, much less an entire audience at an international 
congress of epidemiology, and declared: This is the truth! We 
have found it! To put it more bleakly, no one has ever even 
proclaimed: This is the truth that we seek! 
Nevertheless, scientists seem to deeply appreciate their 
special relationship to the truth. When they proclaim that they 
are in pursuit of the truth, they do not think that truth is a 
temporary stamp of approval or, at worst, merely a compliment 
that can be revoked.9 No. The truth that science seeks—when 
we hear that it has gone hunting—is a permanent special 
something, something to believe in and something to put our 
faith in. Small wonder there are those who align science with 
religion, as both seem to be in search of something that passes 
beyond understanding, yet still explains who we are, why we 
are here, how we live, why we get sick, and how we die.10 
Perhaps it would help matters here to offer a definition 
of truth. The influential philosopher of science, Karl Popper, 
never a friend of definitions,11 nevertheless accepted what he 
  
 8 The scientist’s favorite philosopher, Karl Popper, created three worlds: “the 
physical world ‘world 1’, the world of our conscious experiences ‘world 2’, and the world 
of the logical contents of books, libraries, computer memories, and suchlike ‘world 3’.” 
KARL R. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 74 (1972). The 
world “out there” is world 1, the physical world. 
 9 Richard Rorty, the somewhat radical neo-pragmatist, has expressed the 
view that the term “true” is merely a compliment or commendation for one’s point of 
view. He writes, “The pragmatist . . . . feels free to use the term ‘true’ as a general term 
of commendation in the same way as his realist opponent does—and in particular to 
use it to commend his own view.” 1 RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND 
TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 23 (1991). 
 10 Rorty opines, for example, that we live in a secular world in which the 
scientist has replaced the priest. “The scientist is now seen as the person who keeps 
humanity in touch with something beyond itself.” Id. at 35. 
 11 Karl Popper writes:  
One should never get involved in verbal questions or questions of meaning, 
and never get interested in words. If challenged by the question of whether a 
word one uses really means this or perhaps that, then one should say, “I don’t 
know and I am not interested in meanings; and if you wish, I will gladly 
accept your terminology.” This never does any harm. One should never 
quarrel about words and never get involved in questions of terminology.  
POPPER, supra note 8, at 309-10. 
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called a common sense definition of truth: that which 
corresponds with the facts.12 With this definition, we can 
proceed as long as we have facts. For example, with this 
definition in hand, how can we not accept the truth of some 
well-accepted claims: the existence—the fact—of cancer, the 
existence—the fact—of viruses, and the claim (also a fact?) that 
a virus can cause cancer? To be specific, do we not accept as 
true that the human papillomavirus establishes itself in the 
deep recesses of the cells lining the cervix and then transforms 
some unlucky cell into something uncontrollable, malignant, 
and deadly? Do we not accept as fact and so true that the 
human papillomavirus causes cervical cancer?13  
This final question is a tough one to answer truthfully. 
For we have seen the cancer and the virus with our own eyes in 
photos of malignant cells from pathologists’ slides and electron 
microscopic images of the virus. These we take to be true. And 
we might also accept as true the explanation that this cancer is 
caused by this virus, if it were not for the fact that we have not 
seen causation. Nowhere in the peer-reviewed literature, in the 
tables, nor in the graphs and figures displayed in all the 
studies that have been published, can we find this thing called 
“causation.” Not one of these shows us that, in fact, human 
papillomavirus causes cervical cancer. Not one. To tell you the 
truth, we have seen causation only in words.  
There are many examples of this phenomenon. There 
are many such causal claims, many more now than there were 
a few decades ago, that can be found in this same peer-
reviewed literature, alongside the photos of the viruses and the 
mutated genes—the exposures—and the cancers and other 
diseases—the outcomes—and I believe these to be statements 
that those who wrote, reviewed, edited, and published them 
believe are true, these statements that some exposure caused 
some outcome. But this is a different sort of truth, is it not, 
than the truth we assign to the photos and the tables, the 
graphs, the figures, and the numbers themselves, and to the 
  
 12 “[W]e can define, purely verbally, yet in keeping with common sense: A 
statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts.” Id. at 46 (footnote omitted). 
 13 It is generally believed that human papillomavirus infection causes most 
cervical cancer. See Eduardo L. Franco, Editorial, Cancer Causes Revisited: Human 
Papillomavirus and Cervical Neoplasia, 87 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 779, 779-80 (1995); 
Mark H. Schiffman et al., Epidemiologic Evidence Showing That Human Papilloma-
virus Infection Causes Most Cervical Intraepithelial Neoplasia, 85 J. NAT’L CANCER 
INST. 958, 958-64 (1993); see also Robert C. Millikan, Correspondence, 86 J. NAT’L 
CANCER INST. 392, 392-93 (1994) (letter regarding Schiffman et al., supra). 
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existence—the fact—of the causal claims themselves that sit 
there to be read in the peer-reviewed literature? 
The photos and all the rest, including the causal claim, 
are true in the sense that they were recorded at a certain  
point and place in time and will remain there for perpetuity, 
barring some unnatural calamity along the lines of the great 
fire at the Alexandria library. Anyone can see them. There is 
also a clear trail for each back to its origin. The photo of the 
virus came from a laboratory where a researcher turned on an 
electron microscope to take a snapshot of the parasite in all its 
symmetrical and deadly beauty. Likewise, a pathologist photo-
graphed the cells of a tumor that a surgeon carefully cut from 
the cervix of a woman who had the bad luck to be so afflicted. 
Finally, there is the author of the claim itself—that this virus 
causes that cancer—perhaps the same surgeon who also 
trained in epidemiology (a rare individual). Each of these 
individuals has a name—the laboratory researcher, the 
pathologist, the surgeon, and the patient herself—and their 
contributions to the existence of the photos and the sentence 
(all of which could have appeared in the same review article 
about human papillomavirus and cervical cancer) can be 
documented, verified, observed directly, and accepted without 
any uncertainty at all. These really are truths, plain and not so 
simple. 
But the causal claim itself—that this type of virus 
caused that sort of cancer—does not have this same sort of 
connection back to some unique event that can be documented, 
verified, and directly observed. The causal claim is a scientific 
hypothesis and we cannot ever know if it is true in the same 
sense as the existence of the virus, the cancer, and its author. 
The hypothesis can be well supported or not by the available 
evidence. It can be more or less certain, more or less proven, 
but it cannot ever be true. The reason is remarkably 
straightforward. Causation cannot be seen. Causation cannot 
be proven. And the evidence for causation always under-
determines our capacity to choose between the causal 
hypothesis of interest and its various alternatives.14 Nor can 
  
 14 Causal hypotheses, however much we believe in them and regardless of 
how much scientific evidence supports them, can never be true. This remarkable claim 
can best be understood by explaining how the scientific practice of making claims about 
disease causation is affected by three fundamental (causal) problems. These problems, 
which can also be considered constraints on scientific practice, affect anyone who 
examines scientific evidence for the purpose of making causal claims. Like a plague, 
these constraints are not negotiable. They involve, but are not limited to, the extent to 
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which we can see (observe) the thing we call “causation” and the extent to which we 
can prove any causal hypothesis. In the end, these constraints prohibit us from 
claiming that scientific hypotheses about disease causation are true. For the purposes 
here, I refer to these three problems (or constraints) as (1) the fundamental problem of 
causal inference, (2) the fundamental problem of causal logic, and (3) the fundamental 
problem of causation.  
  First, the fundamental problem of causal inference is that we cannot 
observe on the same individual both the effect of a cause (e.g., a disease outcome) and 
what would have occurred had the cause not acted to produce its effect. See generally 
Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 945 (1986). 
This constraint is sometimes called the “counterfactual” condition. If, for example, an 
individual begins taking a new medication and is later diagnosed with an illness or 
condition, we cannot know if that person would have contracted that illness or 
condition without taking the medication. This fundamental problem of causal inference 
is the primary reason why randomized clinical trials are considered the gold standard 
of scientific research in therapeutic and preventive clinical research; randomized trials 
provide the best approximation to solving this problem by assuming that the 
individuals who do not receive the medication or other intervention (e.g., the placebo 
controls) are as similar as possible to the individuals who do receive the intervention. 
Certainly, the control group is not exactly the same as the treated group, but 
randomization assures that the differences between the two groups are distributed 
evenly between them. 
  This fundamental problem of causal inference also explains why control 
groups in any study of human health effects are so important. Epidemiological studies 
do not randomly identify controls, but controls are carefully selected, nevertheless, for 
precisely the same reason they are used in randomized trials: to provide an 
approximate solution to this fundamental problem. Claims about disease causation 
from studies that lack control groups are of questionable validity and reliability. 
  The second constraint, the fundamental problem of causal logic, is also 
known as the problem of “underdetermination.” Underdetermination means that the 
available scientific evidence cannot once-and-for-all determine which hypothesis is the 
true hypothesis among all those involved in a particular situation, such as the main 
causal hypothesis, alternative causes, and chance. It is a straightforward if frustrating 
fact that scientific tests of causal hypotheses cannot provide proof or disproof. By 
“proof” I mean the sort of absolute proof found in mathematics and symbolic logic, the 
kind of proof that cannot be questioned. See generally Ernan McMullin, Under-
determination, 20 J. MED. & PHIL. 233 (1995); Douglas L. Weed, Underdetermination 
and Incommensurability in Contemporary Epidemiology. 7 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 
107 (1997), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_of_ethics_ 
journal/v007/7.2weed.html. The available scientific evidence always underdetermines 
the choice of the best hypothesis that explains that evidence. 
  Underdetermination implies that there is always room for questioning the 
validity and reliability of any scientific test of any scientific hypothesis. Causal 
hypotheses in medicine—such as the hypothesis that a medication (such as 
pramipexole) causes a condition (such as pathological gambling)—are never proven nor 
disproven in a scientific sense. Put another way, the available scientific evidence 
underdetermines the choice between the various alternative hypotheses that can 
explain that evidence. A randomized controlled clinical trial, for example, is a very 
strong test of a causal hypothesis, but it does not prove—once and for all—that a factor 
(e.g., a treatment) causes an outcome (e.g., a cure). That does not mean, of course, that 
we do not use a medication once a randomized trial has shown it to be effective; acting 
on the basis of the results of a trial and using the results of a trial as proof of a 
scientific hypothesis are two very different phenomena, an important point to which I 
will return. Case series, on the other hand, are extraordinarily weak—essentially 
irrelevant and highly unreliable—tests of causal hypotheses; they cannot help us to 
choose between the alternative hypotheses. A “case series” is a report of a collection (or 
group) of individual patients who have experienced a disease or other adverse event 
and were also exposed to some purported causal exposure (e.g., a medication or a 
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causation be made certain. It is, at best, an expert’s judgment, 
at worst, an expert’s guess.15 
This is what I take to be the true that I, as an epidemi-
ologist appearing in court to provide expert testimony, can 
swear to: that exposures exist, that outcomes exist, and that 
causal claims exist. One can also swear that there is evidence—
scientific studies—linking the exposures to the outcomes (or 
not). And there are methods used in the design, analysis, and 
interpretation of those studies—methods both quantitative and 
qualitative, methods analytical and synthetic, methods of 
science, of epidemiology, of statistics, and of philosophy itself. 
That is the truth and nearly the whole truth.  
II. THE WHOLE TRUTH 
Telling the truth is telling that which corresponds with 
the facts. This telling of scientific facts is so straightforward 
and clear that it is unquestionable at best and, perhaps for 
some, unremarkable at worst. The facts of any case of disease 
causation include the published reports of studies designed to 
  
chemical). A case series has no controls, that is, no comparison group. It is impossible 
to use a case study or a case series to distinguish between one cause and another 
explanation for the same outcome, as was explained in my description of the 
fundamental problem of causal inference.  
  The final constraint, the fundamental problem of causation, is the most 
important of all and is the most basic. Simply put, causation cannot be seen. Causation 
itself is not observable. Steven N. Goodman & Jonathan M. Samet, Cause and Cancer 
Epidemiology, in CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PREVENTION 3, 3-9 (David Schottenfeld & 
Joseph F. Fraumeni eds., 3d ed. 2006). We do not—cannot—see a chemical cause 
cancer, nor do we see a virus cause pneumonia. We cannot see a medication cause an 
adverse event. We can certainly measure the exposure to the medication, and we can 
certainly measure the adverse event, the outcome, but we cannot see causation. Critics 
may quickly point out what they believe to be a strong counterargument: do we not see 
that a rock thrown through a window causes the window to shatter? The great British 
philosopher David Hume pointed out that even in this situation, we still do not actually 
see the thing we call “causation.” We see the rock. We see it fly through the air. We 
hear the rock strike the window. We see the window shatter. But we do not actually see 
causation. See Joseph Agassi, Causality and Medicine, 1 J. MED. & PHIL. 301 (1976). If 
we cannot see causation in these everyday circumstances, then it is even more obvious 
that causation cannot be seen when a medication appears to cause an adverse event. 
We can certainly see the medication being taken. We can (often much later) see that an 
adverse event has occurred. But nowhere along that continuum do we actually see 
causation. It is the evidence—our scientific observations—that we “see,” not causation.  
 15 “[Judgment] is regularly invoked when scientific evidence is used to make 
a claim about disease causation in the courts or in regulatory risk assessment.” 
Douglas L. Weed, The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Judgment, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 
135, 135 (2007). Indeed, judgment is probably always used in any such assessment. 
“[S]cientific judgment is not easy to define, although we are fairly clear about the kind 
of judgment we prefer: good, sound, and unbiased.” Id. at 140. It is reasonable to 
assume that some scientists’ judgments are better than others. 
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describe the exposure and the disease in question as well as 
those studies designed to test the hypothesis that the exposure 
caused the disease. In order to approach the “whole truth,” 
however, to these studies we must add the reviews—ideally, 
systematic narrative reviews—of those studies where search-
ing, selection, summarization, and interpretation in causal 
terms occur. Reviews are critically important publications. 
Within these reviews (and commentaries, editorials, textbook 
chapters, and even letters to the editor), experts discuss their 
positions on issues including internal and external validity, 
methodological concerns (both quantitative and qualitative), as 
well as sources of funding, ethics, and practical implications of 
the research findings under review. These all count as facts, in 
a very broad sense, scientifically. 
Curiously enough, both science and the law share this 
feature; careful records of events are kept in both: studies, 
reviews, and commentaries in science, and cases, opinions, and 
commentaries in the law. On the science side, we could also 
add the textbooks, popular (media) commentary, and last, but 
certainly not least, what philosophers of science think about 
the whole complex and lengthy business just described. If by 
“facts” we mean that which has been published, then there is 
only one (major) problem for the expert who raises his hand 
and swears to tell the truth and nothing but the truth: just how 
much of this written record really matters?  
It is no secret that, in practice, science sees this issue—
what evidence really matters in assessing causation—
differently than does the law. The rules for selecting the truth 
(as historical record) differ in these two practices. Scientific 
assessments tend to be much more inclusive than those in 
some courts, where judges have the power to accept and reject 
(as inadmissible) every potential “fact” that the parties bring to 
their attention, subject to the laws of evidence. There are many 
examples of courts selectively rejecting as inadmissible 
scientific evidence that would typically be included in a 
systematic review in the practice of epidemiology.16 
While the admissibility of facts is governed by the rules 
of evidence in the law, science too has rules regarding the 
  
 16 For two different accounts of the admissibility issues post-Daubert in the 
context of general causation in matters relating to health, see Joe S. Cecil, Ten Years of 
Judicial Gatekeeping Under Daubert, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPP. 1) S74 (2005); 
Ronald L. Melnick, A Daubert Motion: A Legal Strategy to Exclude Essential Scientific 
Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPP. 1) S30 (2005). 
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inclusion and exclusion of facts for consideration in an 
assessment of disease causation, as well as rules covering 
which studies to include in a systematic narrative review, a 
process that has been evolving from around the mid-1980s to 
the present.17 Today, a systematic narrative review is a careful 
and transparent process involving the use of search terms and 
databases, and inclusion and exclusion criteria. The process 
includes searching (in some instances) for not-yet-published 
studies and studies required by regulatory agencies but never 
published, and lengthy discussions about the quality and 
validity of these same studies, published or not, but worthy of 
publication nevertheless.18 This process of systematically 
reviewing all (or nearly all) the evidence has become standard 
accepted practice in epidemiology and medicine, indeed, in all 
the biomedical sciences save perhaps for the so-called basic 
(laboratory) sciences—molecular biology, toxicology, etc.—
which tend to produce interesting and important but not-so-
systematic reviews of disease mechanisms. 
A central purpose of a systematic review is to determine 
if the available evidence sufficiently supports and/or warrants 
a claim of causation. Causal claims, in theory, could be—have 
been—made based on the results of single studies and, indeed, 
based on reports of adverse events in single individuals, but 
these are rare and unusual circumstances and, to put it 
bluntly, more likely decisions about what needs to be done (to 
protect the public’s health) than well-tested claims about 
causation.19 Causal claims typically require a body of evidence 
comprised of many studies from different disciplines along with 
  
 17 For an example of methodological guidelines for systematic reviews, see 
Douglas L. Weed, Methodologic Guidelines for Review Papers, 89 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 
6 (1997). 
 18 A systematic review of the evidence is one of several “weight of evidence” 
methods. See Douglas L. Weed, Weight of Evidence: A Review of Concept and Methods, 
25 RISK ANALYSIS 1545 (2005). 
 19 The use of case reports—that is, reports of an adverse event in a single 
individual or a series of individuals (also known as a case series)—as scientific evidence 
to withdraw a medication from the market is discussed and debated in the area of 
pharmacovigilance. See J.A. Arnaiz et al., The Use of Evidence in Pharmacovigilance: 
Case Reports as the Reference Source for Drug Withdrawals, 57 EUR. J. CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY 88, 88-91 (2001); Bruno H.Ch. Stricker & Bruce M. Psaty, Detection, 
Verification, and Quantification of Adverse Drug Reactions, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 44, 44-47 
(2004); Jan P. Vandenbroucke, Case Reports in an Evidence-Based World, 92 J. ROYAL 
SOC’Y MED. 159, 159-63 (1999); Geoffrey R. Venning, Identification of Adverse 
Reactions to New Drugs III: Alerting Processes and Early Warning Systems, 286 BRIT. 
MED. J. 458, 458-60 (1983). 
954 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:3 
the methods of causal inference used to summarize and 
interpret that evidence.  
Given the thoroughness of systematic reviews and their 
centrality in the fields of epidemiology and medicine, it follows 
that they are not only important facts to be considered in an 
expert’s testimony, but the single most important facts, the 
single most important truths, to be recounted, examined, and 
critiqued. And that brings us to the final component of the 
honesty oath: “nothing but the truth.” For if the “truth” is that 
which has already appeared in print, what is left for the expert 
if he has already told that truth, indeed the whole truth with 
the studies and the reviews and commentary and all the rest? 
What remains if that expert has promised to tell “nothing but 
the truth?” 
III. NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH 
As long as we maintain the premise that the truth of 
science is that which has been published—as carefully recorded 
historical events—then the expert who promises to tell nothing 
but the truth has apparently no greater role in the proceedings 
than any other reporter of events. In this situation, the 
scientific expert provides an account of the studies that have 
measured exposures and diseases and have combined that 
information in such a way that the causal hypotheses of 
interest were more-or-less tested. He also provides an account 
of the commentary on those studies, and, most importantly, he 
provides an account of the systematic reviews of those same 
studies, with their causal claims, recommendations for actions, 
and/or recommendations for more research.20  
The only way the expert’s opinions on these matters—
his own assessment of the relevance, reliability, and validity of 
the evidence, the commentaries, and especially the systematic 
reviews and their claims—can be considered “true enough” is if 
  
 20 As I have written elsewhere, 
[Systematic] literature reviews . . . are a longstanding form of synthetic 
method and are ubiquitous in science, appearing in peer-reviewed journals, in 
textbook chapters, and in background material for research funding 
applications. The purposes of systematic reviews can include: claims 
regarding general causation, efficacy of therapeutic or preventive interven-
tions, recommendations for such interventions, and recommendations for 
future research.  
Douglas L. Weed, Evidence Synthesis and General Causation: Key Methods and an 
Assessment of Reliability, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 639, 646 (2006). 
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he presents them in a manner that would be acceptable in the 
practice of science, using the same methods of assessment, the 
same systematic search procedures, and the same criteria (or 
guidelines) for making causal claims. To be compatible with the 
promise to tell nothing but the truth, an expert’s report for the 
court must be as well-prepared and carefully documented as a 
highly-regarded systematic review from any of the several 
institutions which regularly produce such reports: the Institute 
of Medicine (“IOM”) in the United States, the Cochrane 
Collaboration in the United Kingdom, and the International 
Agency for Research on Cancer (“IARC”) in France, to name 
only three.21 The expert, in short, must opine as if he intends to 
submit his views for peer-reviewed publication, following 
reasonably well-established guidelines for transparent syste-
matic reviews. Only then will his opinion on causation be true 
enough to be consistent with the promise he made to the court. 
By no means am I suggesting that the current methods 
for making causal claims from scientific evidence (and I include 
here all types of relevant evidence, from human epidemiologic 
studies to lab-based toxicological studies) are without errors 
and thus free from the need for serious improvements.22  
Nor am I suggesting that the process of peer review in scien- 
tific publishing eradicates all errors—intentional, accidental,  
or fundamental. Far from it. Both processes can be (must be) 
  
 21 The Institute of Medicine, the Cochrane Collaboration, and the IARC 
regularly produce highly regarded systematic reviews of causation issues. For 
representative examples, see COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS, INST. OF MEDICINE, ASBESTOS: 
SELECTED CANCERS (2006); Jimmy Volmink et al., Research Synthesis and 
Dissemination as a Bridge to Knowledge Management: The Cochrane Collaboration, 82 
BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 778 (2004); INT’L AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., IARC SCIENTIFIC PUBL’N NO. 100, CANCER: CAUSES, 
OCCURRENCE AND CONTROL (L. Tomatis ed., 1990).  
 22 As I have written elsewhere: 
It is no exaggeration to say that any epidemiologist who claims he is an 
expert—that he can reliably make claims about causation—is either 
hopelessly naïve or a flagrant prevaricator. As noted earlier, I do not mean to 
suggest that prior claims about what factors or exposures cause illnesses are 
incorrect. 
Douglas L. Weed, Causation: An Epidemiologic Perspective (In Five Parts), 43 J.L. & 
POL’Y 52, 43-53 (2003). My primary concern here is that a careful description of the 
methods of causal inference used in practice is an absolute necessity. It is also the case 
that these methods are in need of improvement. That does not mean that an individual 
epidemiologist cannot be an expert in the methodology of causation. My main message 
here is that the methods of causal inference need to be improved, and thus the user 
must recognize their limitations. Nevertheless, the best situation in practice is to 
comprehensively describe and systematically reference these methods when they are 
used. When no method is described, any causal claim is suspect. 
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improved. Both have a long way to go. The methods of causal 
inference, for example, which we use to synthesize and sum-
marize the available scientific studies and which incorporate 
criteria (or guidelines) for interpreting the summarized 
evidence, are chock full of values—both scientific and extra-
scientific—of the practitioners who invented and use them.23 
To be specific, consider the list of causal criteria 
(sometimes called considerations, aspects, or guidelines) used 
by epidemiologists, physicians, federal regulatory agencies, and 
just about everyone else (including toxicologists) who examines 
scientific evidence for the purpose of making causal claims. 
There are nine such criteria in traditional accounts. Hill’s 
criteria, for example, were described by the medical statisti-
cian, Sir Austin Bradford Hill in 1965; they include strength, 
consistency, dose-response, biological plausibility, temporality, 
specificity, coherence, experimentation, and analogy.24 Funda-
mentally, these are qualitative values with links (in some but 
not all instances) to quantitative results. They are values 
because we believe them to be that which matters when 
assessing the scientific evidence for causation. Other important 
scientific values are the concepts of relevance, reliability, 
validity, and statistical significance. Interestingly, Hill’s 
criteria do not include any of the aforementioned concepts, nor 
do they include predictability or testability. That simple fact 
points out the complexity of the process. All these concepts/ 
criteria/guidelines/values (or whatever else you want to call 
them) are important when making causal claims: relevance, 
reliability, validity, statistical significance, predictability, 
testability, consistency, strength, dose-response, plausibility, 
  
 23 As I have previously commented, 
[I]n the practice of causal inference . . . reviewers of scientific evidence come 
to opposite conclusions using methods that are quite similar on the surface, 
but quite different at deeper levels, where numerous choices are available 
regarding criteria, rules of inference, and other components of the 
methodology. Differing conclusions emerge because reviewers hold dear 
different scientific and extrascientific values that affect these choices. 
Weed, supra note 14, at 122-23. 
 24 Hill’s criteria (or considerations) are one component of a general method of 
causal inference. For an account of Hill’s criteria in the practice of causal inference in 
epidemiology, see Sir Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association 
or Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 295, 295-305 (1965); Weed, supra note 22, 
at 43-53. 
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temporality, experimentation, specificity, coherence, and finally 
the lowly and much-maligned concept of analogy.25  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to sort out the 
relationships among these various values, including how best 
to prioritize them, their definitions, and rules of inference. One 
point to be made here is that all have been used—explicitly 
and, more likely, implicitly—in the practice of causal inference 
over the past fifty years. They are important components of an 
overarching method of causal inference. To these facts I will 
swear. That is the truth, a part of the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth. 
SUMMARY 
Perhaps it is obvious by now that I do not see the 
“truth” as the aim of epidemiology if by “truth” we mean some 
final, absolute, and uncriticizable set of certain statements 
about the causes of diseases. The truth of my science is that 
which has been recorded in its literature. I can relate to that 
truth as the whole truth, if I give special attention to the 
systematic reviews that provide an overall assessment of 
general causation. In turn, I can provide my own assessment of 
general causation in terms of the methods used to make such 
inferences, applied to the available evidence, including prior 
reviews. In doing so, I provide nothing but the truth.  
The scientific aim of epidemiology is explanation rather 
than truth. These explanations arise from and are tested in the 
use of our analytical and interpretative methods as well as 
judgment. They are the best explanations we have today. We 
may choose to act upon them, or not. 
  
 25 It is an unfortunate fact that the authors of one of the most influential 
intermediary textbooks of epidemiology believe that analogy is at best an exercise in 
creative thinking. They suggest that if you cannot find an analogy between one 
potential causal association and another, you simply lack imagination. KENNETH J. 
ROTHMAN & SANDER GREENLAND, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 24-27 (1998). 
